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Abstract
Payment channel networks, and the Lightning Network in
particular, seem to offer a solution to the lack of scalability
and privacy offered by Bitcoin and other blockchain-based
cryptocurrencies. Previous research has already focused on
the scalability, availability, and crypto-economics of the Light-
ning Network, but relatively little attention has been paid to
exploring the level of privacy it achieves in practice. This pa-
per presents a thorough analysis of the privacy offered by the
Lightning Network. We present three main attacks that exploit
publicly available information about the network topology
and its active nodes and channels in order to learn information
that is designed to be kept secret, such as how many coins a
node has available to spend or who the sender and recipient
are in a payment routed through the network. We evaluate one
of our attacks on the live network and, due to cost and ethical
considerations, evaluate our other two attacks on a simulated
Lightning network that faithfully mimics the real one.
1 Introduction
Since its introduction in 2008, Bitcoin [31] has become the
most widely adopted cryptocurrency, with it and the thou-
sands of alternative cryptocurrencies it has inspired being
touted as an alternative to the traditional financial ecosystem.
The decentralized and permissionless nature of Bitcoin allows
users to easily join the network and avoids the need for in-
termediaries and authorities who control the flow of money
between them. Instead, the validity of each transaction is veri-
fied by a consensus decision made by the network participants
themselves; valid transactions are then recorded in the public
blockchain. The blockchain thus acts as a ledger containing
all transactions that have ever taken place.
The need to broadcast transactions to all peers in the net-
work and store them in a permanent ledger presents two prob-
lems for the longevity of blockchain-based cryptocurrencies.
First, it imposes severe scalability limitations: the Bitcoin
∗Both authors contributed equally
blockchain today is over 283 GB, and Bitcoin can achieve a
throughput of only ten transactions per second. Other cryp-
tocurrencies achieve somewhat higher throughputs, but there
is an inherent tradeoff in these broadcast-based systems be-
tween throughput and security [11, 14]. Second, the transpar-
ent nature of the ledger means anyone can observe the flow of
coins, identify the counterparties to a transaction, and link dif-
ferent transactions. This has been shown most decisively for
Bitcoin [4,28,35,38,40], but this type of analysis extends even
to cryptocurrencies that were explicitly designed with privacy
in mind, such as Dash [27, 29], Monero [17, 23, 30, 45], and
Zcash [6, 19, 34], or even across cryptocurrency ledgers [44].
The most promising solutions that have been deployed to-
day to address the issue of scalability are so-called “layer-two”
protocols [15], with the Lightning Network (LN) [33] emerg-
ing as the most popular one since its launch in March 2018.
In Lightning, pairs of participants use the Bitcoin blockchain
to open and close payment channels between themselves.
Within a channel, these two users can make arbitrarily many
off-chain payments between themselves, without having to
use the blockchain in any way. Beyond a single channel,
Lightning supports multi-hop payment routing, meaning even
participants who are not connected directly can still route
payments through a broader payment channel network (PCN).
Nodes in the network are incentivized to help route payments
by a fee they can charge for each payment they forward. Al-
together, the use of channels avoids the latency and cost (in
terms of transactions fees) associated with getting a transac-
tion confirmed on the Bitcoin blockchain.
In addition to the promise it shows in providing better scal-
ability, Lightning also seems to address the issue of privacy.
As we elaborate on in Section 2, the nodes in the network and
most of the channels in the network are publicly known in
order to build up the PCN (although some channels may be
kept private), as is the capacity of a given channel, meaning
the maximum payment value that can be routed through it.
On the other hand, the individual balances associated with
the channel, meaning the actual amount that each participant
can pay the other, are kept secret. Furthermore, payments
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are not broadcast to all peers and are not stored in a public
ledger; indeed, if a payment is done within a single channel
then only its counterparties need ever know it exists. Even if
a payment passes through multiple channels, onion routing is
used to ensure that each node on the path can identify only its
immediate predecessor and successor.
As is the case with ledger-based cryptocurrencies, however,
the gap in Lightning between the potential for privacy and the
reality is significant, as we show in this work. While some of
the works that de-anonymize Bitcoin and other cryptocurren-
cies do so using network data (e.g., IP addresses) [7, 8, 22],
most of them rely instead on attacks that can be conducted
offline and in a passive manner using the blockchain data.
There is no ledger here, so we instead must actively monitor
and participate in the network. We describe in Section 3 how
we run our own Lightning node, as well as the other data
sources we collect. While running a node is itself inexpensive,
some of the attacks we develop are too expensive or time-
consuming for us to carry out on a relatively modest budget.
To nevertheless evaluate these attacks, we developed a simu-
lator for the Lightning network. In comparison to other recent
LN simulators [5,9,10,13,46], we believe ours to be the most
realistic in terms of its assumptions and the distribution of
payments it produces, as we argue in Section 4.
Concretely, we consider the following three privacy prop-
erties that LN promises [2, 24]:
Third-party balance secrecy says that although the capac-
ity of the channel is public, the respective balances of the
participants should remain secret. We explore this property
in Section 5 by presenting and evaluating two methods by
which an active attacker (i.e., one opening channels with
nodes in the network) can discover channel balances.
Off-path payment privacy says that any node not involved
in routing a payment should not infer any information re-
garding the routing nodes or the payment value. We explore
this property in Section 6 by presenting and evaluating a
method by which an active attacker can use the ability to
discover balances to form network snapshots. By comparing
consecutive network snapshots, the attacker can infer pay-
ments by identifying where and by how much the balances
of channels changed.
On-path relationship anonymity says that intermediate
nodes routing the payment should not learn which other
nodes, besides their immediate predecessor or successor, are
part of the payment’s route. They also should not learn the
length of the route or their position within it, or link this
payment to previous payments involving the same nodes.
We explore this property in Section 7, where we leverage our
LN simulator (described in Section 4) to evaluate the ability
of an intermediate node to infer the sender and recipient in
payments that it routes.
1.1 Ethical considerations
The attacks presented in Sections 6 and 7 are evaluated on
a simulated network rather than the live one, so do not raise
any ethical concerns. We evaluate our attacks in Section 5,
however, on the live test network and on parts of the main
network. We made every effort to ensure that our attacks
did not interfere with the normal functioning of the network:
the messages sent during the attack have no abnormal effect
and do not cost any money to process, and their volume is
relatively modest (we sent at most 24 messages per node we
attacked). We thus believe that they did not have any long-
or short-term destructive effect on the nodes that processed
them. We will also disclose the results of this paper to the
Lightning developers at the time of its submission.
1.2 Related work
We consider as related all research that focuses on the Light-
ning Network, particularly as it relates to privacy. Most of the
previous research has focused on the scalability, utility and
crypto-economic aspects of LN [9, 20, 21, 24, 42], or on its
graph properties [26,39]. Rohrer et al. [37] study the suscepti-
bility of LN to topology-based attacks, and Tochner et al. [41]
present a DoS attack that exploits how multi-hop payments
are routed. Among other findings, they show that the ten most
central nodes can disrupt roughly 80% of all paths using their
attack. Nowatowski and Tøn. [32] study various heuristics in
order to identify Lightning transactions from the underlying
Bitcoin blockchain.
In terms of privacy, Malavolta et al. [25] identify a new
attack exploiting the locking mechanism, which allows dis-
honest users to steal payment fees from honest intermediaries
along the path. They propose anonymous multi-hop locks as
a more secure option. Herrera-Joancomartí et al. [16] inves-
tigate a balance discovery attack, which we re-implement in
this work as our “oracle-aided” attack, and carry it out on part
of the test network. The main limitation of this attack is its
reliance on the specifics of the error messages it receives. We
overcome this limitation by presenting a new generic attack
(in Section 5), as well as investigating the implications of
such an attack more broadly (in Section 6).
Béres et al. [5] look briefly at the question of finding the
sender and recipient of a payment. Similarly to our work,
they develop an LN traffic simulator based on publicly avail-
able network snapshots and information published by certain
node owners. They still make several simplifying assump-
tions, however, such as assuming all payments carry the same
value and all nodes run the same software. We thus believe
our simulator more faithfully mimics the actual behavior in
LN, as we argue further in Section 4. Furthermore, their work
examines the question of anonymity (finding the sender and
recipient) but considers only single hop payments and does
not look at other privacy properties.
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There are a number of other Lightning network studies
that use a network simulator [9, 10, 13, 46]. Several of these
simulators were used to perform economic analysis of the
Lightning network [9,13,46], while the CLoTH simulator [10]
provides only performance statistics (e.g., time to complete a
payment, probability of payment failure, etc.). However, all
of those simulators make several simplifying assumptions
about the topology, path selection algorithm, and distribution
of payments. As such, they are not suitable for an analysis of
its privacy properties.
2 Background
At the most fundamental level, the Lightning Network (LN)
allows its participants to pay each other. Unlike Bitcoin and
other cryptocurrencies, the key idea is that individual transac-
tions do not have to be published on a blockchain.
In order to open a channel, two parties, Alice and Bob, de-
posit a certain amount of bitcoins into a 2-of-2 multi-signature
address, meaning any transaction spending these coins would
need to be signed by both of them. These committed funds
represent the channel capacity; i.e., the maximum amount of
coins that can be transferred via this channel. The payment
channel is associated with inward and outward balances, rep-
resenting how the funds are distributed between Alice and
Bob. This information is captured in the channel’s state.
Once a channel is established, Alice and Bob announce
it to the rest of the Lightning Network. They can also start
exchanging arbitrarily many payments, as long as either party
has a positive balance. In order to settle a payment, Alice
and Bob update the balances and sign a new commitment
transaction representing these balances. These transactions
alter the channel state but are not broadcast to the main ledger;
for this reason, they are said to happen off-chain. Either of
them can close the channel at any time by broadcasting the
latest mutually signed commitment transaction. This means
only two transactions are ever submitted to the blockchain:
one when the channel is open, and one when it is closed.
This process describes how two users can pay each other
if they have an open channel between them. What is more
likely, however, is that Alice and Bob are not connected di-
rectly, so instead need to route the payment through the global
Lightning Network. This can be represented as an undirected
multigraph G= (V,E), where nodes represent users and edges
represent channels. Nodes are publicly associated with some
uid and a public key pkuid. Edges are publicly associated with
a channel identifier cid, the overall channel capacity C, and a
fee fee that is charged for routing payments via this channel.
Privately, edges are also implicitly associated with the inward
and outward balances of the channel. The topology of this
network, along with all public labels, is known to every peer.
There exist also private channels that are not included in this
public topology and revealed only at the time of routing; we
discuss these further in Section 3.2.3.
To perform this multi-hop routing, Alice additionally uses
onion routing to hide her relationship with Bob. This means
each intermediate node knows only its immediate predeces-
sor and successor, and none of the nodes can reconstitute the
whole route. Alice selects the entire path to the destination
(source routing), based on the public capacities and fees asso-
ciated with the channels between her and Bob. Once a path
is selected, the eventual goal is that each intermediate node
forwards the payment to its successor, expecting that its pre-
decessor will do the same so its balance will not change. The
nodes cannot send the money right away, however, because
if one channel has sufficient capacity for the payment but
not a sufficient outward balance, the payment fails. Equally,
the payment could fail due to a malicious intermediate node
simply deciding not to forward it.
To thus create an intermediate state, and to unite payments
across an entire path of channels, the Lightning Network
uses hashed time-lock contracts (HTLCs for short), which
allow for time-bound conditional payments. While it is not
necessary in order to understand the rest of the paper, we
provide more details about HTLCs (and how channels work)
in Appendix A.
To have Alice (sender) pay Bob (recipient) using multi-hop
routing, the protocol thus follows five basic steps:
1. Invoicing Bob generates a secret x and computes the hash
h of it. He issues an invoice containing h and some amount
amt that he wants to be paid, and sends it to Alice. The
pre-image x will later be used to settle the channels along
the route Alice uses.
2. Onion routing Alice picks a path A→U1→ ··· →Un→
B, using the publicly available information about the net-
work topology and fees. To route her payment along this
path, Alice forms a Sphinx [12] packet destined for Bob
and routed via the Ui nodes. Alice then sends the outermost
onion packet onion1 to U1.
3. Channel preparation Upon receiving onioni from Ui−1,
Ui decodes it to reveal: cid, which identifies the next node
Ui+1, the amount amti to send them, a timeout ti, and the
packet onioni+1 to forward to Ui+1. Before sending onioni+1
to Ui+1, Ui and Ui−1 need to prepare their channel by up-
dating their intermediate state using an HTLC based on the
values h and ti. The HTLC ensures that if Ui−1 does not
provide Ui with the pre-image of h before the timeout ti,
Ui can claim a refund of their payment. After the state is
updated, Ui can send the packet onioni+1 to Ui+1.
4. Invoice settlement Eventually, Bob receives onionn+1
from Un and decodes it to find (amt, t,h). If amt and h
match what he put in his invoice, he sends the invoice pre-
image x to Un in order to redeem his payment of amt. This
value is in turn forwarded backwards along the path.
5. Channel settlement At every step on the path, Ui and
Ui+1 use the value x to settle their channel, i.e., to confirm
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the updated state, reflecting the fact that amti was sent from
Ui to Ui+1 and thus that amt was sent from Alice to Bob.
3 Data Collection & Measurements
In this section, we describe our data sources and present some
preliminary measurements about the collected data.
3.1 Data collection
Unlike blockchain data, gathering data about the Lightning
Network (LN) cannot be done after the fact and instead re-
quires us to be an active network participant. To do this for
both the test network (testnet) and main network (mainnet),
we ran the lnd client from April 13, 2019 to February 14, 2020
and scraped the results of the describegraph command ev-
ery hour in order to form snapshots of the public network
graph.
The gathered snapshots provide us with ground-truth data
about the network graph, including information about the
nodes (identifiers, network addresses, status, etc.) and their
channels (identifiers, capacity, endpoints, etc.). To augment
this dataset, we also scraped user-submitted (and validated)
data from 1ML, which is an LN search engine.1 This included
data such as node names, client versions, and operating system.
We describe this data further in Section 4.
To analyze on-chain transactions, we also ran a full Bitcoin
mainnet and testnet node, using the BlockSci tool [18] to
parse and analyze the raw blockchain data. As of February 14,
2020 the mainnet dataset was 283 GB, containing 503 million
transactions, and the testnet dataset was 33 GB, containing
54 million transactions.
3.2 Measurements
As of February 14, 2020, the LN testnet had 3,003 nodes and
8,612 open channels, with a total capacity of 607.74 BTC.
The mainnet had 6,372 nodes and 35,987 open channels, with
a total capacity of 880.02 BTC.
3.2.1 Network statistics
Lightning nodes have the option of choosing to broadcast
(1) no address or some combination of (2) an IPv4 address,
(3) an IPv6 address, and (4) a .onion address. To broadcast
no address, the node must keep the IP address field of the
configuration file blank (which it is by default). This means
that other nodes are unable to initiate a connection with this
node, but it is still able to open connections with others.
For each node in the scraped dataset, we recorded the type
of address it reported (if any). In testnet we found that 83.78%
reported only an IPv4 address, 1.64% only an IPv6 address,
1https://1ml.com/
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Figure 1: The split of funds in channels closed with two
outputs, averaged across a mainnet Bitcoin block.
4.42% only a .onion address, 5.17% reported a mixture of
addresses, and 4.98% were incorrectly set to broadcast a lo-
calhost address. In mainnet we found that: 55.45% reported
only an IPv4 address, 0.56% only an IPv6 address, 22.18%
only a .onion address, 21.29% reported a mixture of addresses,
and 0.51% were incorrectly set. The main difference is that
there is a much higher percentage of nodes in mainnet running
with only a .onion address, as well as reporting mixture of
addresses.
3.2.2 Blockchain statistics
The data we collected from LN included the hash of the Bit-
coin transaction used to open each channel. By combining this
with Bitcoin blockchain data, we were thus able to identify
when channels closed and how their funds were distributed.
Across our entire collection period, we identified 84,080
channels, of which 47,347 had closed with a total capacity of
1372.47 BTC. For each channel that was closed, we analyzed
the scripts used in the Bitcoin transaction, which were all (ac-
cording to the LN specification) a P2WSH (“pay-to-witness-
script-hash”) address. 67.20% of channels were claimed by a
single output address (i.e., the channel was completely unbal-
anced at the time of closure), 31.41% by two output addresses,
and 1.39% by more than two outputs.
Of those channels claimed by a single output, over 88.23%
closed with at least 90% of their capacity. However, 1.90%
closed with less than 50% of their original capacity, meaning
they paid a significant amount in transaction fees. For those
channels claimed by two outputs, Figure 1 shows the split of
coins between the two parties, as well as the amount lost to
fees. Over 45% of these channels had 90% or more of the
capacity claimed by a single output, meaning they were still
fairly one-sided.
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3.2.3 Private channels
Our attacks are all applicable only to public channels; i.e.,
channels that have been announced and are included in the
public network graph. It is also possible to use private chan-
nels, however, and even to route via these private channels by
including them in the route_hints field of a payment invoice.
We thus seek to determine an upper bound for the number
of private channels, in order to understand the scope of our
attacks on the public network.
To obtain anecdotal evidence for the existence of private
channels, we first gathered 122 payment invoices by interact-
ing with merchants (i.e., making a fake purchase without pro-
ceeding with the payment) identified on 1ML and Lightning
Network Stores.2 We then scanned the QR codes contained
in these invoices and found that 62 were invoices for unique
destination addresses (as merchants often use payment gate-
way providers), and 15 of these (24%) contained information
about private channels. Once we knew that private channels
were thus used relatively frequently, we aimed to find them
in a systematic way by looking at the opening and closing
of channels represented in the Bitcoin blockchain. In this we
were guided by previous work on channel identification [32]
and by our own ground-truth data.
To align with our network data collection period, we first
looked for all Bitcoin transactions that (1) occurred after April
13, 2019, (2) before February 15, 2020, and (3) where one of
the outputs was a P2WSH address. We identified 1,219,541
transactions matching this pattern. This was compared with
the 44,587 public channels opened during this period, which
suggests the need to refine this heuristic. To create these re-
finements, we used our ground-truth data about the opening
transactions of these public channels. From these known open-
ing transactions, we identified features that we then used to
develop a heuristic for identifying other potential opening
transactions. These additional features were as follows:
• 99.99% of our known opening transactions had at most
two outputs, which likely represents the funder of the
channel (1) creating the channel and (2) sending them-
selves change.
• 99.93% had a P2WSH output address that received at
most 16,777,215 satoshis. This is the current maximum
capacity of a channel in lnd.
• 100% had a P2WSH output that appeared at most once
as both an input and output, which reflects its “one-time”
usage as a payment channel and not as a reusable script.
By requiring our collected transactions to also have these
three features, we were left with 216,651 potential transac-
tions representing the opening of private channels. Again, this
suggested the need for further refinement.
If the outputs in these transactions had spent their contents
(i.e., the channel had been closed), then we were further able
2https://lightningnetworkstores.com/
to see how they did so, which would provide better evidence
of whether or not they were associated with Lightning. Again,
we identified the following features based on known closing
transactions we had from our network data.
• 100% had a non-zero sequence number, as required by
the Lightning specification [2].
• 100% had an input that was a 2-of-2 multisig address,
again as required by the Lightning design (see Ap-
pendix A).
• 100% had a single input (which was the 2-of-2 multisig
address).
• 98% had at most two outputs, which reflects the two
participants in the channel.
By requiring our collected opening transactions to also
have a closing transaction with these four features, we were
left with 27,313 pairs of transactions that were potentially
involved in opening and closing private channels, 37% of the
channels we observed. Again, this is just an upper bound;
there are other reasons to use 2-of-2 multisigs in this way that
have nothing to do with Lightning. Nevertheless, it broadly
matches our anecdotal evidence, in which private channels
were involved in 24% of the invoices, as well as a recent blog
post from the BitMEX research team that estimates 27.8% of
all channels are private [36].
4 Lightning Network Simulator
In this section, we describe the LN simulator we developed
in order to measure the feasibility of our attack on the on-
path relationship anonymity in Section 7. We rely on the
simulator to evaluate our attacks because performing them
in the live network would require significant resources (e.g.,
running many nodes), which is financially impractical and
raises ethical concerns.
In order to simulate the Lightning Network as closely as
possible and minimize the assumptions made about it, we
parameterize our simulation according to data we collected
from our own interactions with the network or other public
sources, as described in Section 3.1. We implemented our
simulator in 2,624 lines of Python 3.
4.1 Node and network parameters
Network topology. As mentioned in Section 2, we represent
the network as a graph G = (V,E). We obtain the informa-
tion regarding V and E from the snapshots we collected, as
described in Section 3.2, which also include additional infor-
mation such as capacities and fees. The network topology
view of our simulator is thus an exact representation of the
actual public network.
Geolocation. Recall from Section 3.2 that nodes may publish
an IPv4, IPv6 or .onion address, or some combination of these.
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If a node advertised an IPv4 or IPv6 address then we used it
to assign this node a corresponding geolocation. This enabled
us to accurately simulate TCP delays on the packets routed
between nodes, based on their distance and following previous
studies [14] in using the global IP latency from Verizon.3 For
nodes that published only a .onion, we assign delays according
to the statistics published by Tor metrics, given the higher
latency associated with the Tor network.4
Path selection. As discussed in Section 2, the route to the des-
tination in LN is constructed solely by the payment sender. All
clients generally aim to find the shortest path in the network,
meaning the path with the lowest amount of fees. As shown
by Tochner et al. [41], however, both the routing algorithm
and the fee calculation differ across the three main choices of
client software: lnd, c-lightning, and eclair. We could not easily
extract or isolate the routing algorithms from these different
implementations, so chose to implement all three versions of
the path finding algorithm ourselves. We did this using Yen’s
k-shortest path algorithm [43] and the networkx Dijkstra’s
SPF algorithm.5
Our collected snapshots did not include information about
software versions, so we scraped the Owner Info field for each
node listed on the 1ML website. Although in 91% of the cases
this field is empty, the results allow us to at least estimate the
distribution of the client software. We obtained information
about 370 nodes and found that 292 were lnd, 54 were c-
lightning, and 24 were eclair. We randomly assign software
versions to the remaining nodes in the network according to
this distribution, and then modify the weight function in the
path finding algorithm according to the software version.
Channel balances. In order to simulate realistic payments, it
is important to know the individual balances associated with a
channel, and not just its capacity. To do this, we leverage the
results of the balance discovery attack presented in Section 5.
As we will see there, we learn not only the concrete balances
for a number of channels, but also identify patterns in terms
of how the balances tend to be split. We thus assign channel
balances according to the ground truth data and heuristics
described in detail in Section 5.
4.2 Payment parameters
In this section, we discuss the parameters that we use to
simulate payments; e.g., the frequency at which payments
are sent or received.
Payment distribution. Different nodes will have different
volumes of sent and received payments according to their us-
age of the network. To model this distribution of payments as
accurately as possible, we distinguish between three different
3https://enterprise.verizon.com/terms/latency/
4https://metrics.torproject.org/onionperf-latencies.html
5https://networkx.github.io/documentation/stable/reference/algorithms/
shortest_paths.html
categories: Merchant, Router and User. We denote as Sx and
Rx the probability of a payment being respectively sent or
received by a node belonging to category x for x ∈ {m,r,u}.
The intuition behind these parameters is that users buy
goods or services, meaning they initiate more payments than
merchants or routers so Su is higher than Sr or Sm. Similarly,
merchants receive more payments than users or routers, so
Rm is higher than Ru or Rr. We also use small Sr, Rr since the
majority of a router’s activity involves forwarding payments
on behalf of other nodes, rather than sending or receiving
payments itself. Within each category, we further group nodes
as having high, medium or low connectivity according to the
number of channels they have. This follows the assumption
that people who have more money are willing to transact
more regularly. We flag a node as having high connectivity if
it belongs in the top 25th percentile of its category, low if it
belongs in the bottom 25th percentile, and medium otherwise.
In order to identify Merchants we first scraped the Directory
tab from 1ML, which gave us 398 public keys of nodes la-
belled by 1ML as providing various services. We augmented
this with another publicly available data source, the Lightning
Networks Store6, which contains a list of the online merchants
that support Lightning payments. In total, we collected the
public keys of 525 Merchant nodes. We found no similar data
sources concerning Router nodes, but intuitively this type of
node routes many payments due to its strategic connectivity,
and thus gains profit by earning fees. Hence, we focus on
the profit-driven agenda of these nodes, which requires them
to be online and available at all times in order to maximize
their profit. Moreover, a node with more connectivity and
large capacity is more likely to be a reliable router. Therefore,
from the set of remanining nodes we collect the top 20% of
nodes with the highest connectivity and capacity, and have
at least 90% uptime.7 Overall, we flag 50 nodes as Routers.
Our classification results align with previous studies [39, 41]
which study nodes with the highest betweenness centrality.
We then labelled all the remaining 4044 nodes as Users.
Payment volume. In order to estimate the total number
of payments tpay happening in the Lightning Network per
day, we use as a starting point the estimates published by
LNBIG [3], the largest node that holds more than 40% of
the network’s total capacity at the time of writing. Accord-
ing to LNBIG, the total number of routed transactions going
through the network is 1000-1500 per day. However, this esti-
mation does not capture the payments performed via direct
channels. Since it is not possible to know the exact number of
payments happening via direct channels, we estimate the per-
centage of such payments using our simulator. We simulate
10,000 payments for a span of a day8 for 10 different choices
6https://lightningnetworkstores.com/
7A node might go offline for a short period of time due to a software
upgrade.
8This is far more than the actual number of LN payments per day, but
such a large number allows us to minimize the randomness of the results.
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of Sx, Rx. We observed that the number of direct payments
between users, compared to the total number of payments,
fluctuated from 6% to 14% with an average of 9%. Given
this result, our estimation for the total payments per day is
tpay = 1250+1250 ·9% = 1362. However, since this cannot
be taken as ground truth knowledge, for the rest of the pa-
per we continue treating tpay as a parameter and try different
values for it, while of course keeping our choices realistic
compared to this estimation.
Payment value. For payments with a merchant as a recipient,
we chose the value randomly based on the prices we gathered
from scraping products from the websites of 89 different
merchants.
More generally, we assume that nodes with more open
channels and higher capacities make bigger payments, as indi-
cated by the observation of the values our node was asked to
forward. We thus built a value predictor using the following
heuristic. We first compute for every node the average balance
across its channels (Bavg) and the maximum balance across its
channels (Bmax) in order to know the average and maximum
amount the node can forward. We further define the minimum
payment a node can forward (Bmin) as the minimum HTLC
it has across all its channels. Since LN users do not tend
to spend all of their balance at once, as that would require
rebalancing or opening a new channel (both of which are ex-
pensive operations), we also define a parameter Vx ∈ [0,1]
that represents the percentage of a node’s balance that it is
willing to spend on any given payment. The value of each
payment is then chosen randomly from [Bmin,Bmax] following
the Poisson distribution with a mean value of Bavg ·Vx.9
4.3 Simulation results
In this section, we demonstrate the effect that different choices
of tpay, Vx, Sx, and Rx have on the behavior of the simulated
network. In particular, we focus on three main features of
the simulation that determine the effectiveness of our attack
described in Section 7. All the instances we run simulate the
Lightning Network for the duration of a day, using the data
collected on December 19, 2019.
Node throughput. We first define the throughput Tx as the
number of payments a node x forwards per day. We use fixed
values for the parameters Sx and Rx since our goal is to mea-
sure how different values of tpay affect Tx.
In particular, we group nodes into four categories, accord-
ing to the number of channels they possess (1-150, 150-300,
300-500, 500+). We next measure the average number of
payments each of these categories forwards per day, given
different values of tpay. These values range from a realistic es-
timate of the volume of payments today (as discussed earlier)
to a dramatic increase that may reflect a broader adoption of
9The Poisson distribution is not bounded, so we resample all the values
that happen to be outside this range.
LN in the future. The results are in Figure 2a. We observe
that the number of channels a node has influences the number
of payments it forwards, as might perhaps be expected. In
particular, for tpay = 2000 we see that a node with over 500
channels forwards around 276 payments per day, whereas
a node with 150-300 channels forwards slightly above 130.
When tpay = 4500, the node with the maximum number of
channels forwarded 1,485 payments, which translates to a
throughput of 0.0172 payments per second.
Paths tried per payment. We next focus on the number of
paths each initiated payment attempts in order to successfully
reach its destination. Again, we fix the parameters Sx and Rx;
we also fix tpay, as we argue that increasing the number of
payments will inherently increase the number of failed paths,
so this does not reveal any insight into the network.
In particular, we group the payment attempts into four
categories representing the number of paths attempted (1, 2,
3, and 4+). We then run the simulation for three different
values of the parameter Vx (which determines the value of
payments): 0.005, 0.2, and 0.5. The results are in Figure 2b.
The main insight here is that payments with higher values
have an increased probability of failing due to insufficient
balances of the nodes along the path. For example, when
Vx = 0.05 a payment has a 78.85% chance of succeeding on
the first attempt, whereas when Vx = 0.5 only 42.18% of the
payments succeed on the first attempt.
Path length. Finally, we focus on the length of the paths cho-
sen by senders, and how it is affected by the category and
connectivity of the sender. As such, we fix both tpay and Vx,
and instead choose different values of Sx = [Su,Sm,Sr] and
Rx = [Ru,Rm,Rr], as shown in Figure 2c. In particular, by
definition Routers have higher connectivity compared to the
other two categories, so we aimed to measure how the pres-
ence of well-connected nodes on the endpoint of a payment
affected the number of intermediate hops.
Indeed, we see in Figure 2c that when gradually increas-
ing Sr and Rr (the sending and receiving ratios of a Router),
the attempted paths become smaller. For example, when
Sr = Rr = 0.1, the probability of a path being of length three
is 30.08% but when Sr = Rr = 0.4, the probability becomes
40.52%. The difference between different parameter choices
here, however, is noticeably smaller than with our other mea-
surements, which suggests that the network topology and the
client path finding algorithm have a much larger effect on
the path length than the number of Routers. This agrees with
recent research (also based on a simulated network) showing
that paths with one intermediate node are more prevalent than
all other path lengths [5].
5 Balance Discovery
In this section we perform two attacks on the LN testnet and
mainnet in order to discover the actual balances associated
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Figure 2: The effect of different parameters on different aspects of our simulated Lightning network. The detailed simulation
settings are presented in Appendix, Table 1.
with individual channels, as opposed to just their overall ca-
pacity. The first technique, which we call an oracle-aided
attack, has been discussed in the literature [16] and even car-
ried out for a part of testnet, by targeting the top 11 nodes
that account for 50% of the total number of open channels.
This attack requires the attacker to run only a single node,
but it must exploit debug information returned by error mes-
sages. As such, it would no longer be possible if error mes-
sages were generic. We run this attack on all nodes in testnet
and run a partial attack on mainnet.
The second technique, which we call a generic attack, is
new. Here, the attacker must run two nodes, and the attack
exploits messages in the log files of the attacker’s nodes. Due
to the extra cost associated with running two nodes, we run
this attack on testnet but run only a restricted version of it on
mainnet.
5.1 Oracle-aided balance inference
As outlined in Section 2, a number of conditions must be
satisfied in order for a node to successfully claim a payment.
If these conditions are met and a payment is successfully
routed, the sender will eventually receive a hash pre-image x.
If unsuccessful, then according to the current LN specification
they will receive an error with some debug information that
allows them to identify the problem. This information acts as
an oracle and can be exploited to determine the exact balance
of the channel at the time at which the attack is performed.
To carry out this attack, we open a channel with each node
in the network and forward a fake payment hash, with some
associated payment amount amt, through each of its channels.
If we receive an unknownpaymenthasherror then we know
that the channel is able to forward payments this big; i.e.,
that this side of the channel has a balance of at least amt. We
then repeat the attack using a binary search on the payment
amount, reducing it if we receive an InsufficientFunds
or TemporaryChannelFailure error message and increas-
ing it if we receive an unknownpaymenthasherror or
IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails message. We run
this until we identify the exact balance with 1-satoshi-level
precision.
The cost of this attack is the cost of opening and closing
the channels, which requires on-chain transaction fees, and
the opportunity cost of investing the coins elsewhere.
5.1.1 Testnet results
We attacked the testnet most recently from January 7, 2020 to
January 9, 2020. The attack took a number of days because
we allow the node to open a new channel, wait for confir-
mation, run the attack, close the channel, and then repeat.
Alternatively, one could parallelise the process, opening a
large number of channels at once, and then attack them si-
multaneously. In particular, opening and closing a channel
is a time-consuming process due to the latency involved in
having a transaction confirmed on the Bitcoin blockchain.
Testnet coins are of essentially no value, so the monetary cost
for us to perform this attack was negligible. Due to our local
configurations, we attempted to connect only to nodes with
public IPv4 addresses.
At the start of the attack the network had 3,035 nodes
sharing 8,665 channels with a total capacity of 592.22 BTC.
Of these, we were able to connect to and open direct chan-
nels with 132 nodes, attempting to attack 4,585 channels. We
discovered the balances of 619 channels, worth a collective
47.68 BTC.
Given that the majority (90.86%) of the channels we at-
tempted to attack failed, we looked into the reasons why. On
many of them, we received errors such as ChannelDisabled
(meaning the channel was disabled due to an issue with one of
the nodes), PermanentChannelFailure (there was an issue
along the route), UnknownNextPeer (the target node could
not be found despite having a channel, e.g. zombie channels)
or we timed out as the client took more than 30 seconds to
return a response. Others returned errors due to our route not
containing correct channel properties, an incorrect fee calcu-
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lation, or incorrect expiry times. Moreover, we were not able
to connect to a majority of the overall nodes, which again hap-
pened for a variety of reasons: some nodes did not publish an
IPv4 address, some were not online, some had their advertised
LN ports closed, and some even refused to open a channel.
Of the channels where we were able to discover the balance,
we considered how one-sided the channels were by exploring
what percentage of the overall channel capacity was held by
the attacked party, as shown in Figure 3a. As we can see,
many (45%) of the channels were fairly one-sided, with the
attacked party holding 90% or more of the total capacity.
5.1.2 Mainnet results
Given our limited supply of bitcoins and their high price,
we targeted only a limited set of nodes on mainnet to keep
our attack within a relatively modest budget, in total opening
0.131124 BTC worth of channels (976.78 USD at the time),
paying 3.92 USD to open and close channels.
We carried out the attack on mainnet most recently from
December 18, 2019 to December 19, 2019. At this point in
time the network had 6,107 nodes and 35,069 channels, with
a total collective capacity of 859.53 BTC.
We attempted to open channels with the top ten nodes by
capacity, but only successfully opened channels with six, as
the remaining four refused the connection, timed out, or did
not broadcast an IPv4 address. We attacked 1,293 channels,
and were able to infer the balance of 678 channels with a total
capacity of 6.06 BTC.
Similarly to our attack on testnet, 47.56% of our channel
attacks failed due to a variety of errors. Of those that were
successful, we again looked at how one-sided the channels
were; the results are in Figure 3b. The result here is ultimately
similar to the one in testnet, with 50% of the channels having
at least 80% of the funds controlled by the attacked party.
5.2 Generic balance inference
As discussed above, the oracle-aided attack relies on the debug
information available inside error messages in the current
implementation of LN. This still works as of version 0.9.0-
beta of the lnd client, but its reliance on implementation details
raises the question of how else balances could be discovered,
and in particular how to do it in a generic way.
Our generic attack requires running two nodes: one with a
channel with outgoing balance, and one with a channel with
incoming balance. This is because the goal for an attacker
controlling nodes A and D is to form a path A→ B→C→ D
in order to find the balance of the channel B→C. Obtaining
the channel A→ B is easy, as the attacker can just open a
channel with B and fund it themselves. Opening the channel
C→ D is harder though, given that the attacker must create
incoming balance.
Today, there are essentially two options for doing this. In
the first, the attacker can open the channel C→ D and fund it
themselves, but choose to assign the balance to C rather than
to D (this is called funding the “remote balance” due to the
structure of transactions in Lightning). This presents the risk,
however, that C will immediately close the channel and take
all of its funds. The second option is thus to use a liquidity
provider (e.g., Bitrefill10 or LNBIG11), which is a service that
sells channels with incoming balance.12
5.2.1 The attack
Once the attacker sets up the configuration A→ B→ C→
D described above, their goal is to learn the balance of the
intermediate channel B→C. To do this, they route a payment
hash H through B and C with the destination set to D and
with some associated amount amt. They then wait until the
payment hash arrives at D. If D does receive H, this means the
channel from B to C had sufficient balance to route a payment
of size amt. If D did not receive H after some timeout, the
attacker can assume the payment failed, meaning the value
exceeded the balance from B to C. Either way, the attacker
can (as in the oracle-aided attack) repeat the process using
a binary search on the value. Eventually, the attacker can
discover the balance of the channel as the maximum value for
which D successfully receives H.
This attack generalizes to a certain extent even to the case
in which there is more than one intermediate channel between
the two attacker nodes. In this more general case, however, the
above method identifies the bottleneck balance in the entire
path, rather than the balance of an individual channel.
5.2.2 Attack results
We attempted to perform this attack on testnet multiple times,
as recently as February 14, 2020. Every channel in the test-
net we attacked returned a balance of 739 satoshis, however,
giving only TemporaryChannelFailure as error messages.
Given the results from the oracle-aided attack, we knew this
was incorrect. We are unsure of the exact issue, given the myr-
iad difficulties we encountered working with Lightning; this
again highlights the difficulty of working with live networks
as compared to blockchain data.
We also performed this attack on mainnet on February 14,
2020. As we did not want to give away our bitcoin to the
funder, we paid a service to open and fund a remote channel
to our node. More precisely, we paid for one channel (25
USD) from liquidity provider Bitrefill, with a remote capacity
of 0.165 BTC. We then analyzed the channels of the Bitrefill
node, randomly selected two target channels and connected
10https://www.bitrefill.com/
11http://lnbig.com/
12Bitrefill, for example, sells a channel with an incoming balance of
5000000 satoshis (the equivalent as of the time of writing of 493.50 USD)
for 8.48 USD.
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Figure 3: Figures for our oracle-aided balance inference attack. Each one shows the number of channels where the percentage of
the capacity that was held by the attacked party (as calculated from the discovered balance) was within a given range.
to their endpoints, funded local channels with each (with a
higher capacity than the target), and ran the attack. These
two channels had a total capacity of 0.121639 BTC (1254.71
USD). We found that both targets had balances that were
slightly less than half the total capacity of the channel. This
shows that our generic attack is feasible, despite not working
on testnet. In the sections that follow, we use the balances
discovered by the (successful) oracle-aided attack.
6 Payment Discovery
In this section, we analyze the off-path payment privacy in
Lightning, in terms of the ability of an attacker to learn infor-
mation about payments it did not participate in routing.
Informally, our attack works as follows: using the balances
learned in the attack described in Section 5, the attacker con-
structs a network snapshot at time t consisting of all channels
and their associated balances. It then runs the attack again at
some later time t+τ and uses the differences between the two
snapshots to infer information about payments that took place
by looking at any paths that changed. In the simplest case that
only a single payment took place between t and t + τ (and
assuming all fees are zero), the attacker can see a single path
in which the balances changed by some amount amt and thus
learn everything about this payment: the sender, the recipient,
and the amount amt. More generally, two payments might
overlap in the paths they use, so an attacker would need to
heuristically identify such overlap and separate the payments
accordingly.
6.1 Payment discovery algorithm
We define τ to be the interval in which an attacker is able to
capture two snapshots, St and St+τ and let Gdiff = St+τ−St be
the difference in balance for each channel. Our goal is then
to decompose Gdiff into paths representing distinct payments.
More specifically, we construct paths such that (1) each edge
on the path has the same amount (plus fees), (2) the union
of all paths results in the entire graph Gdiff , and (3) the total
number of paths is minimal. This last requirement is to avoid
splitting up multi-hop payments: if there is a payment from A
to D along the path A→ B→C, we do not want to count it as
two (equal-sized) payments of the form A B and B C.
We give a simple algorithm that solves the above problem
under the assumption the paths are disjoint. This assumption
may not always hold, but we will see in Section 6.3 that it
holds for the most part when the interval between snapshots
is relatively short. As such, the algorithm heuristically per-
forms well. Our algorithm proceeds iteratively by “merging”
payment paths. We initially consider each non-zero edge in
Gdiff as a distinct payment. We then select an arbitrary edge
with difference amt, and merge it with any adjacent edges
with the same amount (plus the publicly known fee f ) until
no edge of weight amt can be merged.
A
amt+ fA,B+ fB,C−−−−−−−−−→ B, B amt+ fB,C−−−−−→C ⇒ infer payment A C
We then remove this path from Gdiff and continue with another
edge. Asymptotically the running of this algorithm is O(|E|2)
for E edges; given the size and sparsity of Lightning Network
today this means it runs in under a second.
There are several ways this algorithm can make incorrect
inferences. First, it would incorrectly merge two same-valued
payments A B and B C occurring end-to-end. This is
unlikely to occur often because (1) payments are denominated
in fine-grained units (1 satoshi = 10−8 BTC), and (2) wallets
typically support generating payment invoices in units of fiat
currency by applying the real-time Bitcoin exchange rate,
which fluctuates. Second, our algorithm does not attempt to
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Figure 4: Results of simulated payment detection attack.
resolve the case that a single channel is used for multiple
payments in an interval. Looking ahead to Section 6.3, our ex-
periments show this happens infrequently when the snapshot
intervals are short enough. Finally, as we saw in Section 5,
balance discovery may fail for some (or many) channels in
the network. To cope with this, our algorithm takes a conser-
vative approach designed to minimize the false positive rate:
as a final filtering step, it suppresses any pairs of inferred pay-
ments with approximately the same amount (within a small
threshold of 25 satoshis).
6.2 Attack simulation
We denote the attacker’s precision by P (the number of cor-
rectly detected payments divided by the total number of de-
tected payments) and the attacker’s recall by R (the number of
correctly detected payments divided by the number of actual
payments). We are primarily interested in understanding how
these performance metrics depend on the interval at which an
attacker takes snapshots (τ) and the number of channels (n)
opened by the attacker.
To answer these questions we leverage the simulator we
developed in Section 4, and extend it to include the balance
discovery attack from Section 5. Of the multiple reasons that
our balance discovery attacks failed, we observe that 98% of
the errors were because the peer was not online or did not
participate in any payments. Therefore we set a 0.05 proba-
bility for balance inference failing on a channel in which both
peers are online. In keeping with the discussion in Section 4.2,
we use tpay = 2000 as the total number of payments per day,
Vx = 0.2, Sx = [0.7,0.2,0.1] and Rx = [0.2,0.7,0.1].
To run our experiments, we use the simulator to generate
a sequence of payment and channel balance change events.
We perform five such runs, each simulating a period of 30
days. This amounts to 60,000 total payments per simulation.
When reporting confidence intervals, we consider these five
independent simulation run samples.
6.3 Simulated attack results
6.3.1 Effect of snapshot interval (τ) on P and R
For this experiment, we take balance inference snapshots of
the entire network for varying time intervals, ranging from
τ = 1 second to τ = 215 seconds. Figure 4a shows the re-
lationship between τ and the number of payments inferred
and confirms the intuition that the attack is less effective the
longer the attacker waits between snapshots, as this causes
overlap between multiple payments. At some point, however,
sampling faster and faster offers diminishing returns; e.g., for
τ= 128 seconds, the attacker has a recall R of 82.6%, and for
τ= 64 seconds the recall R is 84.6% and increases slowly to
86.1% for τ= 1 second. With a realistic minimum of τ= 30
seconds, which is the time it took us to run the balance dis-
covery attack on a single channel (the same number has been
reported by Herrera-Joancomartí et al. [16]), the attacker has
a recall of more than 85.5%. Because of our final filtering
step in our discovery algorithm, we have a precision P very
close to 94% for smaller values of τ.
6.3.2 Effect of attacker budget on Recall R
Next, we consider a budget-constrained attacker that can only
open channels with a subset of n nodes rather than the entire
network. We consider an attacker that chooses the top n nodes
with the greatest number of channels. Here we fix the snapshot
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interval of τ= 30 seconds (which, based on our experiment
in Section 5, we believe to be a feasible minimum).
Figure 4b shows how the number of nodes (n) to which
the attacker opens a channel affects the number of payments
inferred. For the same number of nodes attacked, we see that
the oracle-aided attack performs significantly better than the
generic attack. This is because the generic attack requires
successfully connecting to both nodes involved in a channel,
whereas either node can suffice for the oracle-aided attack to
succeed. This is also why we see the recall for the oracle-aided
attack taper off whereas it continues to increase gradually (but
with a decreasing slope) for the generic attack.
As we observe in the oracle-aided attack especially, creat-
ing more channels provides diminishing returns after a certain
point. This is expected given that most payments are routed
through a small subset of nodes (Figure 2a). This suggests
that if the attacker is operating with a relatively modest bud-
get, they can choose to attack a small subset of nodes rather
than the entire network. In our simulation, the oracle-aided
attacker achieved a recall of 70.3% after opening only 100
channels.
Additionally, an attacker may choose to target a subset of
nodes, or even a single target node, for other reasons; e.g., if
it is particularly interested in their payment activities and less
interested in the broader network. By connecting to and then
continuously probing the target node to observe changes in its
balances, the attacker can identify its payments: if the node
was an intermediate routing node, then the channels around
it should have similar incoming and outgoing balances. If
instead only a single channel changed by a particular amount,
that node must have been either the sender or the recipient of
a payment of that amount.
7 Path Discovery
In this section, we describe an attack on the on-path relation-
ship anonymity of Lightning, in which an honest-but-curious
intermediate node involved in routing the payment can infer
information regarding its path, and in particular its sender and
recipient.
In contrast to previous work by Béres et al. [5], we con-
sider not only single-hop routes but also routes with multiple
intermediate nodes. In particular, we leverage our simulator
to define a probability distribution over path lengths and at-
tempted paths per payment, as already explored in Section 4.3.
We then combine this distribution with the topology of the
Lightning Network to define the probability of a successful
attack; i.e., of an intermediate node correctly guessing the
sender and recipient of a payment it was involved in routing.
The only assumption we make about the attacker’s interme-
diate node is that it has enough balance to forward every
payment. This can be easily done in practice by an attacker
rebalancing their channels or running multiple nodes.
We define as PrS the probability that the attacker success-
fully discovers the sender, and as PrR the probability that they
successfully discover the recipient. Following our notation,
Béres et al. claimed, based on their own simulated results,
that PrS = PrR ranges from 0.17 to 0.37 depending on param-
eters used in the simulation. We show that this probability is
actually a lower bound, as it does not take into account multi-
ple possible path lengths or the chance that a payment fails
(their simulation assumes that all payments succeed on the
first try). In particular, we discuss below the ways in which
failed payments leak additional information.
We start by defining the strategy of our attacker. In particu-
lar, whenever they have to guess the sender, they always guess
their immediate predecessor. In other words, if we define H
as the attacker’s position along the path, they always assume
that H = 1. Similarly, whenever they have to guess the re-
cipient, they always guess their immediate successor. Next,
we define the probability of attacker’s success. We focus on
the probability of succesfully guessing the sender, however,
the probability of succesfully guessing the recipient can be
computed likewise.
Successful payments. We start by analyzing the success
probability of this attacker in the case of a successful payment,
which we denote as PrsuccS . We define as Pr[L = `] the prob-
ability of a path being of length `, and as Pr[H = h | L = `]
the probability that the attacker’s node is at position h given
that the path length is `. According to the Lightning specifi-
cation [2], the maximum path length is 20. By following the
strategy defined above, we have that
PrsuccS =
20
∑
n=3
Pr[L = ` | succ] ·Pr[H = 1 | L = `,succ]
= Pr[L = 3 | succ]
+
20
∑
n=4
Pr[L = ` | succ] ·Pr[H = 1 | L = `,succ]
since Pr[H = 1 | L= 3,succ] = 1 given that the attacker is the
only intermediate node in this case. Hence, Pr[L = 3 | succ]
is a lower bound on the attacker’s success probability.
To consider the overall probability, we focus on the con-
ditional probabilities Pr[H = 1 | L = `,succ]. If all nodes
involved in the payment form a clique,13 then it would be
almost equally probable for any node to be in any hop posi-
tion H = h. The only reason the distribution is not entirely
uniform is that some channels may be chosen more often than
others, depending on the relative fees they charge, but we
assume the attacker would choose fees to match its neighbors
as closely as possible. In this case then, the probability that
H = 1 is just 1/(`−2); i.e., the attacker is equally likely to
be in any intermediate position. The success probability thus
13This would rather be a clique excluding a link between the sender and
recipient, since otherwise they would presumably use their channel directly.
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becomes
PrsuccS = Pr[L = 3 | succ]+
20
∑
n=4
Pr[L = ` | succ] · 1
`−2 .
Failed payments. Similarly, in case the payment fails, we
define the probability PrfailS as
PrfailS =
20
∑`
=3
Pr[L = ` | fail] ·Pr[H = 1 | L = `, fail].
This is the same formula as for PrsuccS so far, but we know
that Pr[L = 3 | fail] = 0, since if the attacker is the only in-
termediate node the payment cannot fail. Furthermore, the
conditional probability Pr[H = 1 | L= `, fail] is different from
the probability Pr[H = 1 | L = `,succ], as the fact that a pay-
ment failed reveals information to the attacker about their role
as an intermediate node. In particular, if an intermediate node
successfully forwards the payment to their successor but the
payment eventually fails, the node learns that their immediate
successor was not the recipient and thus that the failed path
was of length L≥ 4 and their position is not L−1. This means
that Pr[L = ` | fail] becomes Pr[L = ` | fail, ` ≥ 4]. We thus
get
PrfailS = Pr[L = 4 | fail, `≥ 4]
+
20
∑`
=5
Pr[L = ` | fail] ·Pr[H = 1 | L = `, fail].
This gives Pr[L = 4 | fail, `≥ 4] as a lower bound in the case
of a failed payment. As we did in the case of successful
payments, we assume a clique topology as the best case for
this attacker’s strategy, in which their chance of guessing their
position is 1/(`− 3) (since they know they are not the last
position). We thus obtain
PrfailS = Pr[L = 4 | fail, `≥ 4]+
20
∑`
=5
Pr[L = ` | fail] · 1
`−3 .
Attack measurements. In Section 4.3, we empirically esti-
mated the probabilities Pr [L = `] for 3 ≤ ` ≤ 20 given dif-
ferent parameters Sx and Rx. We now use those results to
compute the probabilities defined above. The results are de-
picted in Figure 5.
PrsuccS is bounded from below by the probability of the
scenario in which L = 3, since in that case the attacker can
never be wrong. Similarly, the probability of L = 4 gives
us the lower bound on PrfailS . In case of a successful pay-
ment, lower bound probability varies from 30.08% (SimS1) to
40.52% (SimS3). On the other hand, the lower bound of Pr
fail
S
increases with the percentage of unsuccessful attempts, even
up to 74.14% (SimF3 ), which is significantly higher than any
recorded experiment in previous works. Such high probability
of attacker’s success is not just a corner case. According to the
Sim7 Sim8 Sim9
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Figure 5: Probability of correctly identifying the sender given
successful and failed payment. For detailed simulation set-
tings of Sim7,Sim8,Sim9 see Table 1 in Appendix B.
recent measurements presented in [1] 34% payments failed at
the first try. Furthermore, our simulations showed that for an
increased value of payments (Sim6 with VX = 0.5), 58.53%
of the simulated payments had to try at least two different
paths in order to successfully go through (see Figure 2b). This
translates to 8,016 failed attempts in total, in which an adver-
sarial intermediate node had 71.87% probability of knowing
who the sender is.
We computed PrsuccS and Pr
fail
S given our strategy and a
clique topology. We note, however, that these probabilities
might be even higher if the network graph leaks additional
information (e.g., if the preceding node has only one channel
with enough capacity to support the payment etc.), or the
payment fails repeated number of times and hence we can
look for intersection between the neighbour’s of involved
nodes.
8 Conclusions
In this paper, we systematically explored the three main pri-
vacy properties of the Lightning Network and showed that,
at least in its existing state, each property is susceptible to
attacks by nodes who are either active (in the case of our
balance and payment discovery attacks) or passive (in the
case of our path attack). Unlike previous works that demon-
strate similar gaps between theoretical and achievable privacy
in cryptocurrencies, our research does not rely on patterns
of usage or user behavior. Instead, the same interfaces that
allow users to perform the basic functions of the network,
such as connecting to peers and routing payments, can also
be exploited to learn information that was meant to be kept
secret. This suggests that these limitations may be somewhat
inherent, or at least that avoiding them would require changes
at the design level rather than at the level of individual users.
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A More Details on How LNWorks
A.1 Channel management
In this section, we describe in detail the channel management
operations, including its opening and closing, and channel
state updates.
A.1.1 Opening a channel
For Alice and Bob to create a channel between them, they
must fund the channel by forming a funding transaction txfund.
Let’s assume that Alice is the one funding the channel.14
The funding transaction consists of one input, which is a
UTXO associated with one of Alice’s addresses, and one
output, which is a 2-of-2 multisig address representing both
Alice and Bob’s public keys. This means that both Alice and
Bob must provide their signatures in order to release the funds.
The amount sent to the multisig address is the initial capacity
C of the channel.
It is important that Alice does not just put this transaction on
the Bitcoin blockchain; otherwise, her coins may be locked
up if Bob refuses to provide a signature. Instead, she and
Bob first go on to form two commitment transactions, one
for each of them, which represent their agreement on the
current state of the channel. Each commitment transaction
has the 2-of-2 multisig as input, and has two outputs: local
and remote. The transaction txA,i, representing Alice’s view
of state i, essentially sends her current balance to local and
sends Bob’s current balance to remote. Likewise, txB,i sends
Bob’s balance to local and Alice’s balance to remote.
The remote output is simply the address of the other in-
volved party (so addrB in txA,i and addrA in txB,i), but the
local output is more complicated. Instead, the local output in
txB,i is encoded with some timeout t, and awaits some poten-
tial input σ. If the timeout t has passed, then the funds go to
addrB as planned. Otherwise, if a valid revocation signature
σ is provided before time t, the funds go to addrA. This means
that the revocation signature allows one party to claim the
entire capacity of the channel for themselves. As we explore
fully in Section A.1.2, this is used to disincentive bad behavior
in the form of publishing old states.
To create a channel, Alice thus creates the transaction txB,0,
sending C to remote and 0 to local (since so far she has sup-
plied all the funds for the channel). She signs this transaction
and sends her signature to Bob, who signs it as well. Bob then
forms txA,0, sending 0 to remote and C to local, and sends his
14In general, either one of the parties funds the channel, or both of them.
signature on this to Alice. Alice then signs it and publishes
txfund to the Bitcoin blockchain.
At this point, Alice and Bob both have valid transactions,
meaning transactions that are signed by both parties in the
input multisig, which is itself the output of a transaction on
the blockchain (i.e., the funding transaction). Either of them
could thus publish their transaction to the blockchain to close
the channel. Alternatively, if they mutually agree to close the
channel and want to avoid having one of them wait until the
timeout to claim their funds, they could update to a new state
without the timeout in local and publish that.
A.1.2 Updating a channel state
Once both Alice and Bob have signed txA,0 and txB,0, they
have agreed on the state of the channel, which represents
their respective balances BA and BB. In particular, the amount
sent to local in txA,0 and to remote in txB,0 represents Alice’s
balance, and similarly the amount sent to local in txB,0 and
to remote in txA,0 represents Bob’s balance. The question is
now how these transactions are updated when one of them
wants to pay the other one, and thus these balances change.
In theory, this should be simple: Alice and Bob can repeat
the same process as for the creation of these initial commit-
ment transactions, but with the new balances produced by
the payment. The complicating factor, however, is if the old
commitment transactions are still valid after the creation of
the new ones, then one of them might try to revert to an ear-
lier state by broadcasting an old commitment transaction to
the Bitcoin blockchain. For example, if Alice pays Bob in
exchange for some service, then it is important that once the
service has been provided, Alice cannot publish an old com-
mitment transaction claiming her (higher) balance before she
made the payment.
This is exactly the role of the revocation signature intro-
duced earlier. In addition to exchanging signatures on the new
transactions txA,i+1 and txB,i+1, Alice and Bob also exchange
the revocation secret keys skA,i and skB,i that correspond to
the public keys pkA,i and pkB,i used in txA,i and txB,i. These
public keys are derived from base public keys pkA and pkB
such that (1) both Alice and Bob can compute pkA,i and pkB,i
for any state i, thus can independently form txA,i and txB,i as
long as they know the right amounts, and (2) the correspond-
ing secret keys skA,i+1 and skB,i+1 are completely unknown
until one party reveals them to the other. Thus, up until they
exchange revocation keys, they can broadcast the transactions
for state i to the Bitcoin blockchain as a way to close the
channel. Once they exchange the secret keys, however, Bob
can form a valid revocation signature and claim all of Alice’s
funds in local if she broadcasts txA,i (it is indeed only Alice
who can broadcast a valid txA,i as only she has both her and
Bob’s signatures on it). At this point the new channel state
i+1 is confirmed and Bob can safely perform his service for
Alice.
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A.1.3 Closing a channel
As long as either Alice or Bob has a positive balance, they
can send payments to the other, knowing that if there is a
disagreement they can settle their previously agreed channel
state onto the blockchain, as described in the previous sec-
tion. If there is no dispute, and both Alice and Bob agree to
close the channel, they perform a mutual close of the channel.
This means providing a signature that authorizes a settlement
transaction.
A.2 Hashed time-lock contracts (HTLCs)
The previous section describes how the state of a two-party
channel can be updated, in which both Alice and Bob are
sure that they want a payment to go through, and can thus
transition to the new state immediately. In a broader network
of channels, however, it may very well be the case that two
parties need to prepare their channel for an update that does
not happen. To see why, remember from Section 2 that when
Alice is picking a path from herself to Bob, the information
she has about the channels along the way is their capacity
C, which is C = Cin +Cout. If cid(Un−1↔Un) has capacity
C≥ amt but Cout < amt (i.e., Un−1 does not have enough to
pay Un the amount Alice is asking), then the payment fails at
this point, so no one along the path should have actually sent
any money. Equally, the payment could fail due to a malicious
intermediary simply deciding not to forward the onion packet
or otherwise follow the protocol.
To thus create an intermediate state, and to unite payments
across an entire path of channels, the Lightning network uses
hashed time-lock contracts, or HTLCs for short. In using
HTLCs, Alice and Bob can still transition from txA,i and
txB,i to new transactions txA,i+1 and txB,i+1 representing a
payment of n coins from Alice to Bob, but the first message
that Alice sends includes the hash h and timeout t. This sig-
nals to Bob to add an additional output htlc to txA,i+1, which
sends n coins to Alice if the time is greater than t (as a refund)
and sends them to him if he provides as input a value x such
that H(x) = h. Alice and Bob then proceed as usual in ex-
changing signatures and revocation keys for their respective
tpay Vx Su Sm Sr Ru Rm Rr
Sim1 2000 0.2 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.1
Sim2 3000 0.2 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.1
Sim3 4000 0.2 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.1
Sim4 2000 0.05 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.1
Sim5 2000 0.2 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.1
Sim6 2000 0.5 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.1
Sim7 2000 0.2 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.1
Sim8 2000 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.6 0.3
Sim9 2000 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.4
Table 1: Parameters used in each simulation of the Lightning
network presented in Section 4.
transactions.
If at some point before t Bob sends such an x to Alice,
then it is clear to both parties that Bob could claim the htlc
output of txA,i+1 if it were posted to the blockchain. They
thus transition to a new state, i+2, in which they go back to
two-output commitment transactions, with the additional n
coins now added to Bob’s balance.
Going back to the third step in the description provided in
Section 2 then, Ui−1 and Ui prepare their channel by updating
to this intermediate state j+ 1, using the h and ti provided
in the packet onioni to form the htlc output. In the fifth and
final step, they settle their channel by updating to state j+2
by removing the htlc output, once Ui has sent the pre-image
x to Ui−1 and thus demonstrated their ability to claim it. If
Bob never provides the pre-image x, then by the pre-image
resistance of the hash function no party along the path is
able to claim the htlc output, so the payment simply does not
happen. If some malicious Ui along the path decides not to
continue forwarding x, then all previous Uk, 1≤ k≤ i can still
claim the htlc output in the intermediate state.
B Summary of Simulated Parameters
Table 1 summarizes the configuration of all parameters used
in the simulations presented in Section 4 and Section 7.
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